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War Without End? Legal 
Wrangling Without End 
Jeremy Rabkin* 
It is optimistic to argue, as Jack Goldsmith does, that 
debates in the Bush era generated a broad consensus on 
national security law in later years. Rather, partisan critics 
denounced a Republican administration for violating the law, 
then acquiesced to similar practices when implemented under its 
Democratic successors. But politics won’t disappear from 
national security law, because citizens demand security as well 
as law. Political leaders will only embrace fixed rules when they 
accommodate exceptions. We will continue to have debates over 
the exceptions. Even the original expounders of modern natural 
law expected this result.  
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Jack Goldsmith’s book, Power and Constraint,1 is a genuine 
contribution to the history of our time. It offers a wealth of detail, 
reflecting energetic and fair-minded inquiry. I believe its underlying 
interpretation of events, however, is somewhat optimistic.  
In Goldsmith’s account, the debates of the Bush years achieved 
reform of some policies. For other polices, such debates established a 
more firmly grounded consensus, ultimately embraced by the Obama 
Administration. In Goldsmith’s view, this shows that we have a 
system that will restrain impulsive presidential action. I accept every 
detail of Goldsmith’s account, but I remain skeptical of his “relatively 
sanguine” conclusion.2  
I don’t say this as someone determined to counter the positions 
advanced by Professor Goldsmith. A few years ago, Goldsmith 
published (with Darryl Levinson) Law for States, in the Harvard Law 
* George Mason University School of Law.  
1. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012). 
2. Id. at 248.  
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Review,3 expressing general skepticism about such law, noting parallel 
difficulties in international law and American constitutional law. I 
think the skeptical Goldsmith of that article offers a better 
perspective on recent disputes about national security law than the 
optimistic account on offer in Power and Constraint. 
I. Questionable Consensus 
As Goldsmith tells the story in his book, we had fierce debates 
about Guantanamo detention policies, about trial by military 
commissions, and about coercive interrogation practices in President 
George W. Bush’s first term. Reforms were introduced into detention 
policy and into military trial procedures; a blanket ban was imposed 
on “torture.” The most sensible or consensual compromises of the 
Bush era prevailed after they were “vetted, altered and blessed—with 
restrictions and accountability strings attached—by other branches of 
the U.S. government.”4 In short, the system worked.  
I see the larger pattern differently. I am struck not by continuity 
but contrast. Partisan critics of the Bush Administration wielded 
legalist critiques when it was helpful in discrediting Bush policies. 
They then forgot their scruples when the White House was occupied 
by a president who was more to their liking (at least in general). That 
left the Obama Administration free to disregard legal constraints on 
the executive and to disregard even the policy compromises 
supposedly settled by the previous debates. 
Start with the issue of detention. The Obama Administration 
came to office promising to close the detention facilities at 
Guantanamo. It is true (as Goldsmith records) that congressional 
opposition forced the new administration to abandon plans to move 
Guantanamo detainees to U.S. prisons and arrange for civilian trials 
of detainees in the United States.5 But the Obama Administration 
was not willing to develop a new policy to determine when newly 
captured terror suspects could be brought to Guantanamo. Perhaps it 
was unwilling to offend the political constituency that still expected 
Obama to close down Guantanamo and so did not want to be seen 
expanding rather than diminishing the number of detainees there. It 
did not embrace Goldsmith’s confident conclusion that 
Guantanamo—now that “torture” had been outlawed and some form 
of habeas jurisdiction extended there—had been “vetted” and 
“blessed” as a suitable place to bring suspects for long-term detention 
and continuing interrogation. 
3. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
4. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at xii–xiii.  
5. Id. at 11–12.  
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Instead, the Obama Administration stepped up drone strikes on 
terrorist suspects, as if killing terrorists were always preferable to 
capturing, detaining, and interrogating them.6 One might think 
targeted killings would have raised troubling legal questions. 
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration has received far less criticism 
for drone strikes than the Bush Administration did for its detention 
and interrogation practices.  
The Obama Administration received so little criticism that it was 
emboldened to extend the reach of its drone campaign to seemingly 
peripheral targets. The most notable of these was Anwar al-Awlaki, a 
Muslim imam, accused of providing “motivational” videos inspiring 
viewers to engage in terrorism.7 Al-Awlaki was, in fact, a U.S. citizen, 
educated at American universities.8 He was alleged to have 
encouraged potential recruits to participate in terrorist operations, 
but his own direct role in terrorist operations remained sketchy (at 
least in public accounts).9 One might say his videos were clerical 
malpractice, but they probably would not be regarded as criminal 
offenses in the United States. Capital punishment seems a rather 
extreme penalty in the circumstances.  
The Obama Administration assured critics that it would not 
undertake targeted killings except after careful review, a review 
conducted entirely within the executive branch, in secret, without 
participation by the intended target, without any opportunity for 
administrative appeal, let alone appeal to the ordinary courts.10 One 
6. For one of the rare acknowledgments that drone strikes would deprive 
the United States of valuable intelligence that might be gained by 
capture and interrogation, see Marisa Porges, Dead Men Share No 
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
09/25/opinion/dont-kill-every-terrorist.html?_r=0.  
7. Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, From Condemning Terror to 
Teaching Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A1. 
8. Id.  
9. See David Ignatius, The Killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi: The White House’s 
Drone Attack Policy, WASH. POST, POST PARTISAN BLOG (Sept. 30, 
2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan 
/post/the-killing-of-anwar-al-aulaqi-the-white-houses-drone-attack-policy 
/2011/09/30/gIQAT3HAAL_blog.html (citing characterizations of al-
Awlaki as “chief of external operations” for an al-Qaeda group in 
Yemen). 
10. An overview of the administration’s procedures and legal arguments was 
not provided in a formal document but in a speech by Attorney General 
Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law. Eric Holder, 
Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Speech at Northwestern University School of 
Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/ 
speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.  
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might think this “procedure” would raise more concerns than 
anything attempted at Guantanamo. In fact, it provoked very little 
public debate. 
Meanwhile, President Obama repeatedly hailed the killing of 
Osama bin Laden as “justice”11—entirely divorcing justice from any 
form of due process. There was remarkably little public debate about 
whether the Navy Seals who carried out the raid on bin Laden’s 
hiding place in Pakistan had the option of capturing rather than 
killing him. There was little public inquiry even regarding the 
instructions they had actually received from the Obama White House. 
Concern about international law, which happens to prohibit the 
denial of quarter to an enemy willing to surrender,12 almost vanished 
from public debate.  
It might be that public feeling against the perpetrators of the 
9/11 attacks was still too heated for anyone to bother about 
international law in that situation. But consider a different contrast, 
that between the recourse to active war measures under Bush and 
then under Obama. 
The Bush Administration received intense criticism, at least in 
some quarters, for launching the invasion of Iraq in 2003 without a 
formal authorization from the UN Security Council.13 The criticism 
grew more intense when, months after the invasion, investigators still 
could not discover WMDs in Iraq. That seemed to undermine the 
main argument which the Bush Administration had advanced for the 
war—that Iraq had failed to dismantle its weapons programs (or 
failed to satisfy international inspectors that it had done so). 
        Possible legal justifications are reviewed in somewhat more detail in a 
non-committal memo distributed (secretly) to members of Congress. See 
Memorandum from Jennifer K. Elsea, Leg. Att’y, to Congress on Legal 
Issues Related to the Lethal Targeting of U.S. Citizens Suspected of 
Terrorist Activities (May 4, 2012), available at http://www.fas. 
org/sgp/ crs/na tsec/target.pdf. 
11. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 
Osama Bin Laden (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden. 
12. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining “willful killing” as a 
“grave breach”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, art. 40, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting 
“denial of quarter”); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
arts. 8(2)(b)(xii), 8(2)(e)(x), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (defining 
policy “that no quarter will be given” as “a war crime”). 
13. See J. Patrick Kelly, The International Law of Force and the Fight 
Against Terrorism, DEL. LAW., Summer 2003, at 18, 20. 
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President Obama launched air strikes against Libya in the spring 
of 2011.14 He promised that U.S. intervention was only directed at 
protecting civilians in Benghazi and would be over in days.15 The 
intervention went on for more than half a year, as its aim shifted from 
protecting civilians to ensuring the success of rebel forces seeking the 
overthrow of Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi.16 The Obama 
14. See Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya 
Followed Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A8.  
15. The President’s most extended public explanation came in a televised 
“Address to the Nation on Libya,” delivered on March 28, 2011. 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the 
Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-spee 
ch-libya#transcript. Among other things, President Obama said: 
[T]he pledge that I made to the American people at the outset of 
our military operations [was that] America’s role would be 
limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that 
we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the 
operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies 
and partners. Tonight, we are fulfilling that pledge. . . . Going 
forward, the lead in enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting 
civilians on the ground will transition to our allies and   
partners. . . . the United States will play a supporting role—
including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue 
assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications. 
Because of this transition to a broader, NATO-based coalition, 
the risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to 
American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly. . . . The task 
that I assigned our forces—to protect the Libyan people from 
immediate danger, and to establish a no-fly zone—carries with it 
a U.N. mandate and international support. It’s also what the 
Libyan opposition asked us to do. If we tried to overthrow 
Qaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter. We would likely 
have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish that 
mission, or risk killing many civilians from the air. The dangers 
faced by our men and women in uniform would be far greater. 
So would the costs and our share of the responsibility for what 
comes next.  
 Id. 
16. See Libya and War Powers, Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 
89 (2011) (opening statement of Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Senator from 
Indiana). At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
June 28, 2011—three months after President Obama claimed military 
operations would be handed off to NATO allies—ranking member 
Richard Lugar pointed out that actual events had followed a different 
pattern:  
United States war planes have reportedly struck Libya air 
defenses some 60 times since NATO assumed the lead role in the 
Libya campaign. Predator drones reportedly have fired missiles 
on some 30 occasions. Most significantly, the broader range of 
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Administration might thus have been criticized for misleading the 
public and still more for using misleading claims to conceal its larger 
strategic agenda. But there was little fuss when earlier White House 
claims about military intervention were invalidated by subsequent 
events in the Obama era.  
The contrast is all the more striking because President Bush did 
at least seek and receive formal authorization from Congress to 
undertake military intervention in Iraq.17 President Obama insisted he 
did not need such authorization and thus did not seek it and did not 
receive it.18 He was not much criticized, however, for abusing 
presidential war powers.  
And so with the aftermath in each country. President Bush was 
subject to intense, ongoing criticism for allowing Iraq to fall into 
chaotic violence after the toppling of Saddam. Some critics even 
protested the supposed inadequacies of the Iraqi tribunal that tried 
Saddam and sentenced him to death.19 Obama received very little 
criticism for allowing Libya to fall into violent chaos or allowing the 
Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, to be killed in the field by 
opposition guerrillas with considerably less due process than Saddam 
received.  
Americans heard very little about the chaos and violence in Libya 
following the fall of Qaddafi, until the U.S. ambassador and other 
Americans were slaughtered by a well-planned terrorist raid against 
the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.20 The 
administration spent weeks misrepresenting the facts of what 
happened, which did eventually (as truth seeped out) provoke much 
criticism.21 President Obama responded by insisting that those 
airstrikes being carried out by other NATO forces depend on the 
essential support functions provided by the United States. 
 Id.  
17. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. 
18. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, Memorandum Opinion for 
the Attorney General 5 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Authority to Use 
Military Force in Libya], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/ 
2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. For criticism see Michael J. 
Glennon, A Comment on Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. 
NAT’L SECURITY J. FORUM, Apr. 2011, at 1. 
19. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael W. Hanna, Ceding the High 
Ground: The Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute and the Trial of 
Saddam Hussein, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2007). 
20. Helene Cooper, U.S. Shifts Language on Assault in Benghazi, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at A8.  
21. For one effort to unravel the misrepresentations, see Benghazi Timeline, 
FACTCHECK.ORG, http://www.factcheck.org/2012/10/benghazi-timeline 
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responsible for the attack would be “brought to justice.”22 Almost no 
one asked about how this would be done. Such legalistic inquiries 
were out of fashion in the Obama era. 
I believe the point could be extended through a number of other 
contrasts but these examples are sufficient to establish the point. And 
that point is broader than a protest against partisan hypocrisy. The 
relevant point here is that standards for the conduct of security 
policy, particularly outside the United States, are not easily contained 
by legal standards. That does not mean that law has no place in 
debates about foreign or security policy. But it does mean that law is 
bound to be less reliably respected or less consistently applied in 
international disputes.  
Debates in the Bush era might have been less angry and 
moralistic if this truth had been more widely acknowledged. Events in 
the Obama era might have been viewed with more appropriate 
skepticism if this truth had been remembered. Goldsmith’s account 
encourages readers to imagine that we emerged from untrammeled 
executive willfulness in President Bush’s first term into an era of 
standards and constraints in later years. That was always unlikely.  
It was unlikely for reasons illuminated by Goldsmith himself in 
Law for States. That analysis does not appear in the new book, but it 
sheds much light on the events described there and perhaps even 
more on events that unfolded in Obama’s first term.  
II.  International Law Often Lives by Exceptions 
The Goldsmith-Levinson article starts with the common 
complaint that international law is not real law because it does not 
have the requisite clarity and detail.23 The authors acknowledge 
various reasons. Notably, when treaty law or customary law is 
ambiguous, there is no international legislature to offer new 
provisions. International courts can rarely offer guidance, because 
access to such courts is severely limited. The main theme of the 
article is that quite comparable difficulties arise in domestic 
/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2012). For another compendium of false claims, 
see Michael Pearson, What Obama Administration Has Said About 
Libya Attack, CNN (Oct. 2, 2012, 12:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012 
/10/01/politics/libya-attack-statements/index.html. 
22. The president reaffirmed his determination to see perpetrators of the 
Benghazi attack “brought to justice” in his second debate with Mitt 
Romney. Critics interpreted the phrase as a threat to bring down more 
drone strikes on suspects. Glenn Greenwald, U.S. Justice Likely Coming 
Soon to Benghazi with Extrajudicial Executions, THE GUARDIAN (UK), 
Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/19/ 
benghazi-attack-suspects-drones. 
23. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 3, at 1792–93. 
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constitutional law, since the Constitution is (like international 
conventions) very hard to amend by formal process and many key 
issues are not settled by courts. 
Though Goldsmith and Levinson do not emphasize it, these 
problems are particularly acute—in both international law and 
domestic constitutional law—when it comes to security issues. It is in 
this area where appeals to law most often seem to founder on the 
difficulty of achieving agreement on what the law is or what it 
requires. Trade treaties often include long supplements covering many 
distinct issues in great detail. Major trade agreements, such as those 
establishing NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, make 
provision for compulsory arbitration of disputes, allowing the 
accumulation of clarifying case law.24 When it comes to security 
issues, however, there is less treaty law and far less resort to 
international tribunals. In this area, there are almost no provisions for 
compulsory arbitration because states have rarely been willing to 
entrust decisions about the use of force to international arbitration.  
One consequence is that policies can be unavowed, even if they 
are not (or cannot be) fully concealed. The White House allowed leaks 
to reveal American involvement in cyberattacks on the Iranian 
nuclear program but refused to provide any official clarification of the 
underlying policy.25 NATO assistance to anti-Qadaffi rebels in Libya 
was handled in the same way. NATO’s initial intervention was 
justified under a UN Security Council resolution authorizing 
24. The official text of the North American Free Trade Agreement, as 
published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, runs 567 pages for 
the main agreement, then includes a volume of “annexes” of roughly 
equal size, followed by three more volumes, setting out the “tariff 
schedules” provided by each of the three parties to the agreement. 
North American Free Trade Agreement (G.P.O., 1992). The 
Organization of American States might be considered the security 
counterpart to NAFTA; the entire OAS Charter runs to less than 
twenty-five pages in standard format and the provisions most relevant 
to security—”Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and “Collective 
Security”—run less than two pages. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES, arts. 24–28. The World Trade Organization is 
responsible for coordinating compliance with global trade agreements. 
There are some sixty agreements in all, totaling some 550 pages. See 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION,jhttp://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_. 
htm. By contrast, the UN Charter, in a standard format, runs to less 
than 25 pages. The provisions most directly relevant to security run less 
than five pages. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 33–51.  
25. See Peter Beaumont & Nick Hopkins, U.S. Was ‘Key Player in Cyber-
Attacks on Iran’s Nuclear Programme,’ THE GUARDIAN (UK), June 1, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/obama-sped-up-
cyberattack-iran. 
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protection for civilians.26 Plainly, NATO ended up doing quite a bit 
more than that. But it did not say that it was shifting to a new 
policy. Nor did it bother to indicate whether it had changed its view 
of what authorization might be needed for the wider intervention it 
actually pursued. 
It is easy in such cases to charge governments with concealing or 
disguising their actual policies to avoid having to answer for them. 
But it seems to me there is a wider problem. International law 
depends a great deal on practical precedent—that is, real-world events 
rather than judicial interpretations of them—since disputes are so 
rarely brought before international tribunals, especially on security 
related issues. It is even rarer that international tribunals are 
recognized as establishing authoritative precedents.27  
So international law often relies on rough analogies, based on the 
principle that what one nation may do, every other has the same right 
to do. That in turn means that every time a nation acts in a 
disputable way, it is in danger of establishing a dangerous precedent 
in the hands of its enemies or its rivals. A court can say that its 
decision should not be taken as a precedent—as the Supreme Court 
actually did say in Bush v. Gore.28 A foreign ministry cannot so 
readily say the same. If it does, it has even less hope of getting others 
to accept the claim. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) tried to square this circle 
in the Nicaragua case: There is a customary law of armed conflict, the 
ICJ found, even if it seems to be frequently violated.29 Governments 
confirm their support for that law when they claim their actions are 
not covered or are distinguishable, rather than denying the existence 
of any rules.30 That may not convince skeptics that there is enough 
law for an international tribunal to decide particular disputes based 
on that law.31 But as Goldsmith and Levinson note, there are many 
domestic constitutional issues that remain comparably unsettled.  
26. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
27. See U.S. Will Not Fully Recognize World Court Decisions, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 8, 1985, 3:54 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/ 
1985/US-Will-Not-Fully-Recognize-World-Court-Decisions/id-92a3c7ce6 
dd927522b53b743f5cf466e. 
28. “Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the 
problem of equal protection in election process generally presents many 
complexities.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
29. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 92–97 (June 27). 
30. Id. at 98.  
31. See e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 101, 101−02 (1987) (criticizing the ICJ approach to 
customary law in Nicaragua ruling for supposing that generalized 
support for abstract norms can establish concrete customary practice). 
89 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
War Without End? 
Take the question of when or to what extent the president can 
deploy force abroad without a declaration of war. The Supreme Court 
has treated this as a “political question” on which courts may not 
rule.32 The Court has explained that it must bow out of “political 
questions,” that is, questions that do arise under the Constitution, 
but on which courts cannot pronounce. These questions are said to 
lack “judicially . . . manageable standards.”33 If that is not a 
tautology (there will not be judicial standards if courts decline to 
craft any), it seems to imply that in questions like this, there cannot 
be firm rules.  
It does not follow that there is no law of any kind. Certainly, it 
does not follow that there are no standards or criteria with that 
element of moral authority we generally associate with law. Rather, 
courts seem to fear that by pronouncing on such disputes, they might 
endorse or overemphasize some criteria and then exclude or 
marginalize others. What the political question doctrine does is keep a 
range of arguments and considerations in play. Without involvement 
from courts, we cycle through familiar arguments over and over. 
Objections that fail to stop the president in one episode may still be 
deployed, perhaps with more effect, in the next. In the right 
circumstances, somewhat abstract legal arguments may have 
considerable constraining force.  
The Libyan intervention is an apt example. The Obama 
Administration claimed, at the outset, that no congressional 
authorization was required because U.S. involvement would be 
minimal, the fighting would be very brief, and the purpose was to 
assure respect for UN resolutions.34 Subsequent developments belied 
each of these claims. Is U.S. participation in the bombing of Libya, 
then, a precedent for future presidents? Does it serve as a precedent 
for humanitarian intervention, so long as there is some sort of UN 
authorization? Or does it matter whether the Security Council has 
actually authorized the scale of intervention that ultimately develops? 
Does the presence of UN authorization of some kind mean the 
president is free to act without any sort of authorization from 
Congress? A president who assumes Libya is a clear precedent for 
acting without Congress will likely discover otherwise, if his military 
intervention results in significant U.S. casualties. The ambiguous 
Libyan “precedent” of 2011 will not stop critics from invoking 
32. At least, when lower courts dismissed challenges to the legality of the 
undeclared war in Vietnam, the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed 
these rulings. See Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Velvel v. 
Nixon, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 
(1968); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). 
33. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
34. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 18, at 1. 
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constitutional limits when they protest a more costly or controversial 
(and still congressionally unauthorized) intervention in future years.  
The silence of Congress is no assurance of congressional support, 
least of all for a subsequent venture. Congressional passivity preserves 
political space for critics to raise objections in the future, since the 
objections were not squarely addressed, and thus, never decisively 
repudiated. Arguments left on the sidelines in 2011 may prove much 
more effective against the next intervention, even if it seems 
analogous to the pattern in Libya, if the new war proves more costly 
or more unpopular. One can say the same about the United Nations, 
which allowed expansion of the initial NATO mission to proceed 
without formal rebuke. That does not mean the Security Council is on 
record as approving the ultimate mission.  
Justice Robert Jackson famously described the powers of the 
president, in that area between explicit congressional authorization 
and express congressional prohibition, as operating in a “zone of 
twilight.”35 It was a good metaphor, even before Rod Serling took it 
up. What happens in twilight will be seen, at best, in a dim light. In 
such light, observers may discern moving objects, but not see clearly 
what they are. Mere shadows may be mistaken for actual objects. 
What happens in twilight is likely to be interpreted differently by 
different observers.  
The absence of clarity threatens reliable application of rules. But 
it helps to preserve general support for norms, despite disagreements 
about their particular applications or their follow-on implications. 
Commentators often speak of the “gravitational pull” of particular 
rules or norms. It is another good metaphor. That is doubtless why it 
gets invoked both in international law and in various fields of 
constitutional law.36 Advanced technologies have allowed us to 
overcome the force of gravity when we want to do so. But it requires 
a great deal of concentrated energy to launch a rocket or keep a jet 
plane airborne, because gravity still has an effect. So, too, general 
norms may exert continuing influence. 
It might be that we cannot do much better when it comes to 
many international policy choices. It might be that we are asking too 
much when we suppose that law can be as constraining in 
international affairs as track routes are for locomotives.  
35. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952). 
36. See, e.g., Edward Swaine, Subsidiary and Self-Interest: Federalism at 
the European Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 47 (2000) 
(referring to the “gravitational pull” of particular European Court of 
Justice doctrines in national courts). 
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III. Political Crimes and the Gradations of Immunity 
There is a similar pattern when it comes to personal 
accountability—or its seeming converse, immunity. As Goldsmith 
records in his book, human rights groups urged the Obama 
Administration to prosecute Bush Administration officials for 
violating fundamental international norms, particularly the 
prohibitions against torture.37 The Obama Administration made some 
gestures in this direction, insisting that investigations of CIA officers 
accused of torture must be reopened and reconsidered.38 In the end, 
however, the Obama Justice Department declined to pursue actual 
prosecutions of any U.S.j officials involved in Bush-era interrogation 
practices. Human rights advocates protested39 but the protests were 
disregarded by leaders in both political parties and so sank into 
obscurity.  
Accordingly, some human rights advocates have urged that, when 
it comes to Bush-era abuses, justice and the international rule of law 
should be vindicated by foreign courts or by international tribunals.40 
But that remains quite unlikely. Here again, differing priorities get in 
the way, and international law actually mirrors comparable gaps in 
domestic law. 
There is now an International Criminal Court (ICC), which has 
been operating in The Hague since 2002.41 Since the 1990s, a number 
of states have claimed universal jurisdiction to prosecute the most 
extreme human rights violators.42 But there is still no actual 
precedent for the prosecution of government officials from a major 
power by an external jurisdiction. Legal institutions are in place that 
might enable such a prosecution but it is surely not by mere chance 
that no such case has yet been pursued. 
The ICC has turned out to be a very weak institution, completing 
only one prosecution in its first decade.43 States can exempt 
37. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 234–36. 
38. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A., 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1.  
39. See id.  
40. See, e.g., Ex-Powell Aide: Dick Cheney Fears Prosecution for War 
Crimes, NBC, Aug. 31, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44337 
958/ns/us_news-security/#.URwdDaXAdjR.  
41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
42. See Universal Jurisdiction, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org 
/en/international-justice/issues/universal-jurisdiction (last visited Feb. 
13, 2013).  
43. Alex Spillius, International Criminal Court to Deliver First Verdict, 10 
Years and £750 Million After It Opened, THE TELEGRAPH (UK) Mar. 
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themselves from its jurisdiction—at least for potential crimes within 
their own borders—if they simply decline to ratify the ICC treaty.44 
Not only the United States, but Russia, China, India, Turkey, Brazil, 
and dozens of others have declined to ratify. In principle, ratifying 
states are pledged to extradite anyone indicted by the court that can 
be found within their borders.45 In practice, states have broad 
discretion not to extradite, since the court has no means of penalizing 
states that fail to cooperate. For the same reason, the court cannot 
assure that witnesses will come forward or that necessary documents 
are produced.  
Meanwhile, the bulk of the court’s funding and public support 
comes from major states in the European Union.46 The court has no 
means of forcing financial backers to continue their contributions. So 
it would be especially awkward for the court to offend major 
European states or their friends and allies.  
There may still be cases where a weak government prefers to have 
one of its own nationals prosecuted at The Hague. There may be 
cases where a weak state has to accept prosecution of its own 
nationals at the demand of other, stronger states. Such partial justice 
may still be regarded as a form of justice. It remains true that the 
court does not have the capacity to view all offenders impartially. 
Establishing a fully international criminal court does not establish an 
international authority, capable of forcing all states to yield to the 
same law. 
So it has proved with claims for universal jurisdiction. In 
Belgium, Spain, and Germany over the past decade, suggestions that 
prosecutors might pursue charges against top U.S. officials provoked 
angry American protests, followed by changes to the universal 
jurisdiction statutes to avoid such confrontations in the future.47 As 
13, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindia 
nocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/9141687/International-Criminal-
Court-to-deliver-first-verdict-10-years-and-750-million-after-it-
opened.html. 
44. Article 12 limits jurisdiction to crimes committed by nationals of states 
party to the Statute or crimes committed on the territory of a state 
party. The UN Security Council can confer jurisdiction on other states 
through Article 13(b), but permanent members of the Security Council 
are unlikely to agree to jurisdiction against themselves or against states 
they seek to protect. 
45. Rome Statute, supra note 41, art. 89.  
46. Consilium, The European Union and the International Criminal Court § 
2.6.3 (Nov. 2007).  
47. See Belgium Scales Back Its War Crimes Law Under U.S. Pressure, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/02/ 
world/belgium-scales-back-its-war-crimes-law-under-us-pressure.html; 
Mark Landler, Rumsfeld Faces War Crimes Suit in Germany, N.Y. 
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between abstract commitment to universal justice and concrete 
concerns for national security (such as preserving friendly relations 
with a very powerful ally), states gave priority to the latter. Despite 
the excitement stirred by the attempted prosecution of Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1998, there has been no such 
prosecution attempted since then.48 
Rather than dwelling on the weakness of international justice, 
however, we might do better to remember that even national justice 
systems are often quite forgiving of past abuses by government 
officials. The United States waged war against Confederate rebels for 
four years but prosecuted no Confederate leaders after the South’s 
surrender.49 In more recent times, opponents of apartheid in South 
Africa waged a decades-long struggle for justice but accepted a 
general amnesty of apartheid era officials (and terrorist attacks by 
apartheid opponents) in order to achieve agreement on majority 
rule.50 The same happened in Chile and in eastern Europe in the 
1990s; leaders preferred reconciliation and stability to strict justice, so 
instead of prosecutions, there were amnesties.51 
Every organized legal system makes provision for amnesties and 
individual pardons. There is no counterpart power at the international 
level. I believe that is because the pardon power is understood to 
reflect ultimate political judgments outside the normal limits of law. 
National legal systems almost always entrust this power to the 
executive, thus acknowledging that the executive is not simply bound 
by law or bound by law in all decisions. To acknowledge such 
authority on the international plane would be very difficult. It would 
say, in this case, that above the states of the world, there is a 
prosecutor who acts for humanity and he can judge on behalf of 
humanity when justice is better served by pardoning crime than by 
TIMES Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/world/ame 
ricas /14iht-rumsfeld.3532840.html. 
48. See Luc Reydams, The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction, in 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 337–38 (William Schabas 
& Nadia Bernaz eds., 2010). 
49. Despite a presidential order threatening capital punishment for the 
killing of black troops, no Confederates were punished for such war 
crimes. See President Obama: Prosecution Possible for Those Who 
Authorized Torture, ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www2.wjbf. 
com/news/2009/apr/22/president_obama_prosecution_possible_for_t
hose_who-ar-230298/ (noting that prosecution of former officials would 
be the first of its kind and that Lincoln refused to prosecute Confederate 
leaders, even though their actions amounted to treason).  
50. See Jeremy Sarkin, Achieving Reconciliation in Divided Societies, YALE 
J. INT’L AFF., Spring/Summer 2008, at 11, 21.  
51. See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 48, 95–97 (2000).  
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punishing it. The world is not quite prepared to say that in public. So 
there is no provision for a pardon power in the ICC Statute.  
But international justice is not made stronger by concealing its 
weak foundations. If we cannot trust prosecutors to make 
authoritative decisions about pardon, we are, in effect, demanding 
that they conceal their political assessments. The ICC’s first 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, claimed that he had no need to 
worry about whether prosecution might provoke more violence by, for 
example, undermining a transition agreement or a cease-fire 
contingent on an amnesty. The prosecutor’s job, he insisted, was 
simply to follow the law.52 One may hope he was not being fully 
honest. One can be sure that governments will not embrace such 
legalism—disregarding the ensuing death toll so long as a prosecutor’s 
notion of law and justice is served. 
The point is not that the powerful must always escape justice. 
But there is a cost to imposing justice. Saddam Hussein was finally 
brought to justice. Even many human rights advocates seem to think 
the cost of doing so was too high.53 The costs are lower within a state 
that has well-established law. Still, President Ford judged that a 
52. Questioned about the possibility that his attempt to prosecute the 
Sudanese head of state would prolong war in Sudan, Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo explained that his responsibility was “judicial”—that 
is, solely to the law: “I have no political responsibility,” he insisted. 
Thalif Deen, Catch Me if You Can: Sudan’s Case and ICC 
Tragicomedy, SUNDAY TIMES (UK) Mar. 29, 2009, http://sunday 
times.lk/090329/Columns/inside.html. In a speech to the Tenth Session 
of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute, the prosecutor 
elaborated:  
[S]ome of the leaders sought by the [International Criminal] 
Court threatened to commit more crimes to retain power, 
blackmailing the international community with a false option: 
peace or justice. The efficiency of the Court will depend on how 
political leaders and conflict managers react to such blackmails. 
To contribute to peace and security, the Office of the Prosecutor 
has to hold the legal limits, it cannot be blackmailed. 
 
 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Address 
to the Assembly of States Parties (Dec. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ASP10-
ST-ProsecutorLMO-ENG.pdf. The Prosecutor made no effort to explain 
how it can be that efforts to “hold the legal limits” can never threaten 
peace or why there would never be a trade-off between peace and 
justice.  
53. Romesh Rathnesar, Samantha Power: Voice Against Genocide, TIME 
(Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,9 
94021,00.html (“‘My criterion for military intervention—with a strong 
preference for multilateral intervention—is an immediate threat of large-
scale loss of life,’ she has said. ‘That’s a standard that would have been 
met in Iraq in 1988 but wasn’t in 2003.’”).  
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prosecution of former President Nixon would be too politically 
divisive to be in the country’s best interest. That assessment might 
still be debated. It is debatable because people care about upholding 
legal standards, but it is not the only thing they care about.  
IV. Competing Philosophic Perspectives 
Contemporary political debates stir passions. One might think the 
ultimate stakes would be seen more clearly if viewed more abstractly. 
In fact, the same difficulties appear in classic accounts of natural 
justice from centuries ago.  
Perhaps the most influential exponent of natural law, certainly for 
the American Founders, was the 17th Century English philosopher, 
John Locke. Prior to all positive laws enacted by governments, 
according to Locke, mankind was (and still is) obligated to the law of 
nature. That law “teaches all Mankind who will but consult it, that 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his 
Life, Liberty or Possessions.”54 In Locke’s account, there is a standard 
of justice in the state of nature. There can be private property by 
mutual consent in the state of nature and agreement on precious 
metals as a medium of exchange.55 Separate nations, which remain in 
a state of nature with each other, may establish borders by common 
consent.56 So in principle, it would seem disputes between nations 
could be settled appeals to natural law. 
Despite these promising premises however, Locke insists that 
rights in the state of nature are “very unsafe, very unsecure.”57 The 
law of nature contains exceptions for self-protection: everyone is 
bound by the law of nature “to preserve himself and . . . so by the 
like reason, when his own Preservation comes not in competition, 
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind.”58 The 
qualification giving preference to self-preservation allows for a natural 
right to “do Justice on an Offender”—imposing punitive harm to 
deter future attacks on the innocent.59 
The conflicts generated by such self-protective measures may 
explain why rights remain insecure in the natural state, where there is 
no “known and indifferent judge . . . to determine all differences 
according to established law” and no “power to back and support the 
54. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988). 
55. Id. at 300–01. 
56. Id. at 299.  
57. Id. at 351. 
58. Id. at 271 (emphasis altered). 
59. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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sentence . . . and give it due execution.”60 Agreements to establish 
government make rights more secure for individual citizens, at least 
when governments are bound by law. But when it comes to dealing 
with foreigners, governments still must exercise a power that is not 
quite subject to law: 
[W]hat is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much 
upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, 
must be left in great part to the Prudence of those who have 
this Power committed to them, to be managed by the best of 
their skill, for advantage of the Commonwealth.61  
Locke ultimately acknowledges, however, that such discretion is 
not unique to the management of foreign affairs. Locke advises that 
the executive must also retain broad power to make exceptions to the 
law, even in domestic affairs: there must be a “power to act according 
to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of law and 
sometimes even against it” because “it is impossible to foresee, and so 
by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities that may concern 
the publick; or to make such Laws, as will do no harm, if they are 
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all 
Persons. . . .” 62 
The seeming contradictions are, after all, logical. If you think that 
the ultimate purpose of law is to secure rights, it makes sense that the 
law should give way to urgent claims about security (or even to 
humanitarian exceptions to legal justice).63  
The same equivocation following the same logic appears in the 
writings of Emer de Vattel, whose mid-eighteenth century treatise on 
the law of nations, Le Droit des Gens (The Law of Nations),64 had 
enormous influence on the American Founders. The “first general law 
. . . established by nature among all nations,” according to Vattel, “is 
that each Nation should contribute as far as it can to the happiness 
and advancement of other Nations,” but each nation’s “duties toward 
itself clearly prevail over its duties toward others. . . .”65 “The duty 
which nature has imposed upon Nations, as upon individuals, of self-
preservation . . . would be to no effect if they had not at the same 
60. Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted).  
61. Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted).  
62. Id. at 375 (emphasis omitted). 
63. Hence, among other things, Locke makes explicit provision for a power 
in the executive to pardon offenses against the law. Id. at 375.  
64. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 
Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758).  
65. Id. at 6.  
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time the right to prevent any interference with its fulfillment.”66 
What, then, if a nation is “threatened by the increasing strength of a 
hostile power? . . . Will it be time to defend ourselves when we are no 
longer able to?”67 Vattel does not minimize the challenge: “Prudence 
is a duty incumbent on all men, and particularly upon the rulers of 
nations, who are appointed to watch over the welfare of an entire 
people.”68 Fortunately, wise statesmen can find ways to reconcile 
prudence and legality: “There is perhaps no case in which a State has 
received a notable increase of power without giving other States just 
grounds of complaint.”69  
Such concessions to exigency may, of course, undermine respect 
for law and principle. Appeals to law and principle, however, can go 
beyond the point where most of us would be willing to follow. The 
difficulty appears most clearly from the conclusions embraced by the 
most principled philosophical advocate for this alternate view, the 
Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant dismissed the leading 
writers on international law (including Vattel) as “sorry apologists” 
because they actually preached a doctrine which left international 
obligation, hence, the hope of international cooperation and 
international peace, contingent on each nation’s own calculations of 
its own interests.70 Kant preached the moral duty of law, as an end in 
itself. Literally: any thought to particular benefits (or costs) adhering 
to a universal law would, in Kant’s account, undermine the moral 
authority of law as a duty.71 So he denounced any sort of pardon 
power as improper, since a pardon power would imply exceptions to 
the moral force of law.72 Kant also denounced revolution, even under 
the most oppressive government, since revolution could never be 
justified by a general principle without undermining the citizen’s duty 
to obey the law.73  
In international affairs, Kant advocated a peace federation, which, 
by guaranteeing security to every state, would make it unnecessary 
for national governments to weigh their international duties against 
66. Id. at 130.  
67. Id. at 248.  
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 250. 
70. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 103 
(H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed., Cambridge University Press 1991). 
71. Immanuel Kant, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice, in KANT: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 70, at 64–65.  
72. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 
(John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing 1965) (1797).  
73. Immanuel Kant, Relation of Theory to Practice, in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS, supra note 70, at 81.  
98 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
War Without End? 
their more immediate security concerns. As unlikely or impractical as 
the scheme might seem, it did at least face the underlying issue: if 
security is threatened, how can a government simply adhere to law 
without regard to consequences? Kant made freedom the center of his 
doctrine—the freedom to act morally by acting in accord with 
universal principles, rather than distracting personal concerns. In his 
essay on morality and politics, he embraced the maxim, Fiat iustitia, 
pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish)—that is, 
justice at any price.74 It is, in its own way, as logical as Locke’s 
conclusion, once you accept Kant’s very different premise: if the point 
of law is to demonstrate the moral freedom to obey a universal law, 
you shouldn’t care about consequences to yourself or your fellow 
citizens. 
Not many people want to follow this logic, however. Demands for 
adherence to law and principle are most convincing when the cost of 
adherence is expected to be quite affordable. Unyielding commitment 
to principle looks less attractive when it threatens to bring the sky 
crashing down.  
V. Conclusion 
It does not follow that there are no standards for international 
conduct, no norms even for normal times. But once we acknowledge 
that there will be exceptions, we will argue about when and where 
and how much—when we don’t forget about constraining rules 
altogether (because the cost of non-compliance seems so small or the 
cost of full compliance so unacceptable).  
Jack Goldsmith ends his book by acknowledging that the United 
States will eventually endure “another massive terror attack at home, 
perhaps one as catastrophic as 9/11,” prompting “recriminations 
against the presidency” and “recriminations against the accountability 
system for the presidency,” followed by an accretion of new powers in 
the executive and ultimately by a new round of complaints that 
executive powers have been abused.75 “And so the cycle will begin 
again.”76  
I think Goldsmith is right about these predictions. But they come 
at the very end of his book, without acknowledgment of how much 
they call into question the general tenor of the preceding analysis. We 
do not have strong reasons to congratulate ourselves on the 
“accountability” mechanisms that restrained the Bush Administration 
and then failed to impose much serious constraint on Obama. The 
74. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra 
note 70, at 123.  
75. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 248–49.  
76. Id. at 251.  
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compromises reached in Bush’s second term may have been sensible 
policy adjustments or little more than a reflection of the political 
balance at the time. Very likely, we will view the developments of 
recent years in a different perspective after the next great challenge to 
our security.  
We may have no better alternatives. But we should not conceal 
from ourselves that the “law” surrounding national security policy 
remains tenuous, disputed and malleable and is most often interpreted 
by observers—both inside government and outside—driven by a range 
of political concerns, which are sometimes quite partisan and short-
sighted. If we are in for “war without end,” we must expect legal 
wrangling to continue, wrangling that may be intermittent, but will 
prove recurring and always, in the long term, indecisive.  
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